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Ross and Still: Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in European Waters,

existed in authoritarian Japan.” This
clearly had a deleterious effect on the
services’ ability to protect state secrets
and maximize resources via interservice
operational deconfliction, and thereby
to provide quality, focused intelligence
to the nation’s decision makers.
Special Duty is recommended for the
serious academic or intelligence practitioner, as it is not a light romp through
the stirring escapades and gamechanging events of global espionage
and counterintelligence. Rather, it is a
thoughtful book by a true academic who
works to explain the complexities of the
modern world of intelligence, within the
even more complex world of Japanese
culture and history. Besides providing
the reader a look into the world of
intelligence, Samuels offers the student
of contemporary history and strategic
intrigue a glimpse into the bureaucratic
realities within which today’s intelligence services must operate—making
their seldom-known “wins” even more
impressive, and their usually very public
failures all the more understandable.
ANDREW G. WILSON

Victory without Peace: The United States Navy in
European Waters, 1919–1924, by William N. Still
Jr. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018.
392 pages. $68.

This title is the third volume in the
author’s well-known series covering
the U.S. Navy’s operations in European
waters from the end of the American
Civil War until the Navy closed the
European station in 1929. The volume
under review covers the uncertain
period immediately after the First World
War, when stability in Europe was by
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no means certain and rival powers still
were jockeying for positions of influence
in areas that long had been in dispute.
In particular, the demise of the AustroHungarian and Ottoman empires,
together with the Bolshevik Revolution
in Russia, had released long-suppressed
tensions that were threatening the peace
process in a number of regions. Still
vividly describes the stress this created
for the great powers, which, after years
of awful conflict, were understandably
intent on a rapid demobilization and
a return to “normalcy.” Instead, navies
of the former Allies found themselves
embroiled in a wide range of missions
short of conflict—missions that required
specialized skills, and for which they
were, for the most part, poorly prepared.
Still is an accomplished historian
whose research is always of the highest
standard, and this volume continues
that tradition. The work is split
thematically, and to some extent
geographically, into ten chapters, each
of which covers a given mission. The
first three chapters look at the role
that naval officers played in the Paris
peace negotiations, demobilization, and
the uniquely naval challenge that the
removal of the North Sea Mine Barrage
presented. Seven further chapters follow,
each focusing on a specific mission
within a particular trouble spot.
Organizationally, this may be as good
a way as any to present the material.
However, the combination of Still’s
focusing on the personal contributions
of only a few key individuals whose
responsibilities necessarily transcended
many of the individual chapters with
the fact that these events all were
happening concurrently creates some
challenges. For example, the Chief of
Naval Operations and the notable naval
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personalities in each station changed,
sometimes more than once, over the five
years under review. Yet with the start
of each successive chapter Still takes us
back in time through many of the earlier
incumbents’ thinking and interactions,
albeit from a different angle. This makes
everything hard to follow, to the point
where I found myself crying out for a
chart depicting who relieved whom in
each of the key naval positions over the
years in question. Therefore, a good
prior working knowledge of the key
naval personalities of the 1920s and
where and when they served would
enhance the reader’s experience greatly.
Similarly, when it came to the geographic regions depicted in chapter 4 and beyond, it would have been useful to have
included a map of some sort in each
chapter, depicting each of the key places
mentioned in the text. This would have
allowed the reader to tie things together
in terms of time and space and to appreciate better the enormous challenges
posed by the shortages of platforms and
the multiplicity of taskings. Although I
am of European descent and spent most
of my naval career in these waters, I
was forced on many occasions to resort
to online maps to appreciate better
the author’s points—something that
perhaps should not have been necessary.
Finally, it also might have been worth
including a little more detail on what
became known as the “Naval Battle of
Paris” in the first chapter. After all, the
U.S. decision to build a “navy second to
none”—and the obvious impact this was
going to have on a close ally, Great Britain—constituted a monumental policy
decision for the United States, with
ramifications to the present day. Such an
enhanced discussion would have been
of abiding interest to most naval officers
and the readership of this journal.
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These comments notwithstanding, this
book still is a very worthwhile addition
to the library of anyone with a passing
interest in the development of U.S. naval
policy. It covers a rarely addressed and
largely unsung part of naval responsibilities: providing naval support to foreign
policy in its widest sense; this makes it
valuable in and of itself. Even though
general readers may get a little lost in the
minutiae, Still’s attention to detail and
his intimate knowledge of the key naval
personalities of the era give the book a
wide application within the academic
field, particularly for established naval
historians of the period. The eighty-odd
pages of endnotes alone are a rich source
of material that can inspire any number
of supporting studies and additional
work. Finally, it should not be overlooked that this glimpse into how the
U.S. Navy responded in a previous era
of great-power maneuvering could have
renewed relevance in today’s uncertain
times vis-à-vis China and Russia.
ANGUS ROSS

Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges
for the United States, by Mara E. Karlin. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 296
pages. $79.95.

Building Militaries in Fragile States is
a classic example of a doctoral dissertation transformed into a book. The
author seeks to find the reason that
U.S. efforts to create strong militaries
in weaker countries are successful—or
not. Her answer highlights the role of
external actors, as well as the degree
to which the host nation is willing to
allow the United States to get involved
in deep and sensitive matters of state
(e.g., the assignment of personnel,
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